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Friedrich Nietzsche notoriously eschewed conventional use of stable categories like truth and fal-
sity or good and evil in his writing, and is commonly thought to have reduced human agency to 
the operation of complex material causes. As a result, Nietzsche’s cultural criticism is thought to 
be little more than an aristocratic jeremiad occasioned by the nihilistic tendencies of his age. But 
are there any principles or concepts that allow us to make sense of Nietzsche’s recommendations 
for individuals and culture, beyond the coordinates of truth and falsity, or the dictates of custom? 
The collection Nietzsche’s Therapeutic Teaching, edited by Horst Hutter and Eli Friedland, pursues 
the lines of thought surrounding the prognostic, diagnostic, and therapeutic claims within the 
Nietzschean corpus. Generally, this line of thought extends through the major works to apho-
risms scattered in unpublished notebooks, to letters and biographical details; reinforced by refer-
ences to Nietzsche’s reception of Hellenistic philosophy, with representative thinkers like Hip-
pocrates, Epicurus, Empedocles as well as figures like Asclepius and Eris. The collection explores 
an emergent field of inquiry in Nietzsche’s philosophy that seeks to explain how concepts like 
agonistics, care of the self, askesis, and nihilism shape his thought on themes like suffering, peda-
gogy, training, regimen, responsibility, and self-cultivation. A common outlook among the au-
thors of Nietzsche’s Therapeutic Teaching is that Nietzsche adheres to a general notion of philoso-
phy as a practice to be cultivated—or, a way of life. Essays in this vein are more or less indebted 
to Shaping the Future, where Hutter argues that ascetic practices for reshaping life on the individ-
ual and collective register are a prescriptive focus for Nietzsche, with a mind to both present cul-
ture and the formative potentials lurking in the pathological depths of the human psyche. As such 
a general account of the collection risks misattributing an author’s positions, I will now turn to a 
closer reading of the individual essays. 
 The initial essays in the collection focus on Nietzsche’s future-oriented philosophy, placing 
him as a successor to Hellenistic schools of thought that centered on philosophy as a central prac-
tice for life. Horst Hutter offers a perspective on Nietzschean therapy as an etiological diagnostic 
practice that aims to interrupt pathologies of thought and action by calling for new forms of polit-
ical and social organization. According to Hutter, Nietzsche’s perspective on the history of philo-
sophical and religious movements demonstrates that “the human soul has revealed itself as a 
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most complicated structure of command / obedience […] with a strong tendency toward chaos” 
(9). In Nietzsche’s specific cultural moment, with the popularization of democratic and humanist 
sentiments, powerful spectacles of violence and other methods of ruling through fear needed 
suitable replacements. Nietzsche is known to have drawn on his study of Hellenistic philosophy 
and advocated small communities fashioned after the model of Epicurean “garden communities” 
(10). As Martine Béland argues, Nietzsche’s Hellenistic studies resulted in a “conflict between his 
profession and his vocation” (14). Béland positions Nietzsche’s retirement not as required due to 
his health, but rather a choice made for therapeutic reasons, he “quit the profession for the voca-
tion;” a biographically verifiable point that is often lost in purely exegetical readings of the phi-
losopher (25). Nathalie Lachance also combines biography with exegesis, positing that “Nie-
tzsche’s whole philosophical project itself can be interpreted as his own education and emancipa-
tion—and those of the reader—through and against the great opponents that are Socrates, Jesus, 
Schopenhauer, Kant and Wagner, to name a few” (32). His treatment of these “great opponents” 
can be situated within the struggle between three opposing philosophical concerns; that of the 
transmission of tradition and the deconstructive and creative drives that animate his reception of 
this tradition. Also drawing on Nietzsche’s criticisms of institutional instruction, where students 
are “prepared for the world as it is” under the “safe weight of tradition,” Lachance pre-
sents aphoristic style as a pedagogical strategy aimed at putting envy to use, guiding students to 
overcome those that they respect. Or, as José Daniel Parra articulates, Nietzsche's philosophy of 
the future aims “to conceive of ways of living shaped by the incorporation of both cyclical, erotic, 
eternal recurrence and linear, spirited, willful self-overcoming” (54). From this we can discern 
that a Nietzschean academy would need to include spiritual healing, self remembering and self 
care.  
The subsequent essays converge on the themes of agonistic tension, community, and the 
therapeutic convictions that guide Nietzsche’s thought on these topics. Willow Verkerk writes 
about social relationships of Zarathustra; why Zarathustra is weary of his disciples, his concerns 
or fears about having too loyal friends or followers. He argues that Nietzsche’s understanding of 
friendship is a representative example of agonistic social relationships, arguing further that many 
worthwhile friendships are “cruel” in the sense that they include discomfort, competition and 
duplicity. Verkerk argues that Nietzsche advocates two forms of friendship: “one of the warrior 
of the agonistic, lion-hearted, and the other of the master, of the nobler type of self-affirming, be-
stowing person” (63). However, Nietzsche also refers to friendship disparagingly, this “lower cat-
egory of human relationships” includes “usury, comradeship, and erotic love and involved rela-
tions of convenience, servitude, and tyranny,” but given the former, preferred archetypes, it can-
not be said that he is equivocal about the topic of friendship (63). Friendships or communities that 
include discomfort, competition, and struggle are valued by Nietzsche for the way they include 
the potential for self-improvement or self-regulation, but friendship and community are not valu-
able in their own right. Readers familiar with Thus Spoke Zarathustra will recall that Zarathustra 
often retreats into solitude for his own benefit. Verkerk argues that Zarathustra disparages those 
sorts of relationships that allow “weakness of the will, narcissism and self-delusion” to flourish, 
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and enacts the bestowing and agonistic roles as a therapeutic reprisal to the former concerns. Bela 
Egyed tackles Nietzsche’s two-faced claim that Zarathustra is a book “for everyone and no one” 
(73), arguing against the interpretation that he is simply an “elitist” or an “aristocratic radical;” he 
is also a deeply apolitical thinker. Egyed writes, “Nietzsche is not interested in educating the 
masses. He thinks that they are just fine as they are, with their morality and their religion. His 
main fear is that the higher types will be brought down to the same level” (74). Egyed offers the 
perspective that Nietzsche’s teaching advocates “critical freedom”—the freedom to change as an 
apolitical answer to the stultifying effects of culture and custom. Yunus Tuncel focuses on the ag-
onistic elements of Nietzsche’s writing, arguing that they comprise a therapeutic tech-
nique. Tuncel traces the influences of Nietzsche’s understanding of agonistics in order to draw 
the ancient connections between agonistic tensions, contests, pedagogy, justice, and festi-
val. While these themes are present in his early work, Tuncel argues that Nietzsche’s understand-
ing of power, which is “about obeying and commanding; that is, it is about hierarchy whether it is 
within the individual or within a community” (85). Such an articulation of power certainly runs 
counter to democratic or humanist sentiments (which would ostensibly connect power, sover-
eignty, and justice with the virtues of equal participation, not competition); Tuncel argues that 
from Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze, power is inalienable, arguing further that “many of our 
social ills stem from shunning power and not developing healthy forms and exercises of power” 
(89). Or, put another way, we commonly tend to think of exercises of power in an individualistic 
sense that de-politicizes their potential. Tuncel argues that it is not the individualistic aspects of 
agonal culture in ancient Greece that attracted Nietzsche’s eye, but rather “the agonal culture of 
ancient Greece offered a different paradigm of communal assembly, a paradigm that helps heal 
the soul of individuals and culture at the same time” (89). After tracing the origins of agonistics in 
Nietzsche’s work, Tuncel argues that the bellicose rhetoric of Nietzsche’s polemics should be seen 
as an agonistic praxis with the goals of rehabilitating the individual (author/reader) as well as cul-
ture (in terms of the targeted causes and ideas which presumably have wide effects). Keith An-
sell-Pearson focuses on Nietzsche’s relationship with Epicurean philosophy in its manifestations 
in Nietzsche’s thought on care of the self and of the world. Nietzsche’s reception of Epicurean 
philosophy centers on the insight that an explanation of the causes and effects that comprise na-
ture can free us from fear and superstition, or, put otherwise, that physics grants therapeutic 
knowledge. Further, many tropes within Nietzsche’s writing associated with therapeutic or prog-
nostic claims follow Epicurean principles. Tracing the complex relationship between Nietzsche 
and Epicurus from the early to middle period of his writing, Ansell-Pearson connects the care of 
the self with ecological concerns that animate the writings of his middle period. Nietzsche turns 
to Epicurus in the middle period, where his writings shift inwards, reliant on the “patient labor of 
self analysis and self-cultivation as a therapy of the body and soul” (111). There are several ana-
logs that Ansell-Pearson points to that connect Nietzsche and Epicurus, they share the tendency 
to “demythologize nature, embrace human morality, and accept human nonexeceptionalism” 
(111). In the later writings, these analogs are not enough to spare Epicurus from falling out of Nie-
tzsche’s favor, but the connection does identify a Hellenistic source for his free spirit period.  
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The subsequent essays converge on uncovering the practical dimensions of Nietzschean 
therapy; identifying a set of practices that he adapts from Hellenistic sources. Michael Ure also 
connects Nietzsche to the Hellenistic notion of philosophy as a way of life. Instead of focusing on 
the demythologizing effects of philosophy, Ure draws our attention to the harmful and cruel ori-
gins of demythologizing knowledge, delight in malice, and schadenfreude. Scientific knowledge, if 
it is to liberate us from fear of the natural world, must be able to reframe the world. As the science 
of his time demonstrated that biological life was both a rare and contingent phenomenon, Ure ar-
gues that, like the Stoic philosophers, Nietzsche sought to rehabilitate the anthropocentric views 
that permeated this period. What Ure calls Nietzsche’s ‘view from above’ is meant to encapsulate 
1) the absurdity of such insignificant beings seeking significance by way of interpreting their own 
suffering developing into 2) an “Olympian attitude toward [human] suffering” (125). Ure charac-
terizes the Olympian ‘view from above’ as something which “elevates [free spirits] above distress 
so that they can enjoy nature as a spectacle,” a trope that Nietzsche develops from the Stoic tradi-
tion (125). By developing a distance from emotions like compassion, which place individuals into 
the drama of human suffering, individuals can “attain greatness” through their detachment to the 
distress of those that they harm or sacrifice in the pursuit of knowledge. Ure’s account does not 
fully elaborate precisely how “harm” or “sacrifice” are meant here (does Nietzsche intend to sug-
gest that we literally should sacrifice other people for the sake of knowledge?) but instead argues 
that the sort of emotional distance that Nietzsche proposes is realistically more effective in practi-
cal care. Whereas emotions like pity risk “doubling” the suffering of the sufferer, the ‘view from 
above’ allows one to set an example that others can follow in order to ‘overcome’ the stultifying 
effects of human suffering.  
 Rainer J. Hanshe focuses on Zarathustra’s practice of incubation, an oneiric state that leads 
to philosophical revelations. Hanshe connects this practice to the examples of Parmenides and 
Empedocles, who were thought to formulate their teaching in accordance with the wisdom 
gained from dreamlike states “as opposed to developing it abstractly” (142). In Thus Spoke Zara-
thustra, the prophet’s sleep is often a turning point in the action of the story, where new insights 
are gleamed, connecting the notions of stillness and communicative silence. Highlighting the cen-
trality of stillness and still hours to the text, Hanshe’s work positions the ancient Greek practice of 
incubation as an alternative to abstract thought in the formulation of new truths.  
 Babette Babich draws our attention to Nietzsche’s attempt to draft a drama “titled after 
Holderlin’s Death of Empedocles” and connections between the work of Lucian on Empedocles ti-
tled “Journey to Hell” and Thus Spoke Zarathustra (157). Babich argues that the similarities be-
tween the two stories “permits us to read Zarathustra as an explicitly Empedoclean figure” in the 
sense that Empedocles famously rejected tyrannical power, and that Zarathustra too has no desire 
for worldly supremacy (158). Graham Parkes combines the biographical with the exegetical, argu-
ing that Nietzsche’s life long affinity with unhewn stone is an undercurrent of his thought that 
manifests in the imagery of his works. By connecting stone with the themes of self fashioning, 
fate, and eternity in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Parkes offers an unusual reading of Nietzsche that 
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serves as a foil for the contemporary fascination with tropes of movement, fluidity, and flux in his 
work. 
Lawrence J. Hatab connects Nietzsche’s understanding of consciousness and language to 
contemporary findings in developmental psychology. Hatab presents a number of congruous 
moments in the speculative anthropological or psychological claims of Nietzsche and findings in 
developmental psychology about the effects of private speech in the development of self-
consciousness; connecting the commanding/obeying structure of Nietzsche's psychology to the 
role of private speech in a child’s development “toward independent functioning” (194).  
Nandita Biswas Mellamphy focuses on Nietzsche’s diagnostic claims, analyzing his ‘politi-
cal physiology’ as “a politics of the transformation of the Human into the Overhuman directly 
within the context of the immanent intensification of nihilism” (206). Directly approaching the 
apparent lack of grounding concepts like “truth” or “good,” Mellamphy focuses on the difference 
between “health” and “illness” as an “intensive not substantial” difference that animates the diag-
nostic moments of Nietzsche's thought (what she terms Nietzsche’s ‘Experimental ontology’). 
Mellamphy identifies the context of nihilism as a central reason as to why he does not proceed 
either “by dialectics or by fascism,” proposing a non-anthropological agency that animates poli-
tics and results in memory making political subjects (209). Mellamphy writes, “in the politics 
conditioned by nihilism but which seeks to overcome nihilism by activating the potency on nihil-
ism, the philosopher-physician must be a homeopathic toxicologist governed and guided by the 
principle of “like cures like” (simili similibus curentor)” (214). Whatever curative agency there is for 
the philosopher-physician requires an eye for the intensive differences within the political, even 
those which “may be considered by the majority as signs of ‘health’“(214). 
The final essays focus on theological strains in Nietzsche’s thought. Béatrice Han-Pile 
draws on the work of Anders Nygren in order to attempt to discern what sort of love Nietzsche 
advocates in the formulation amor fati. Han-Pile presents Nygren’s view as though it typified the 
distinct senses of love within the Christian traditions in an uncontroversial way, and that these 
categories would also be shared by Nietzsche. While it may be the case that Nygren and Nie-
tzsche were both born into the same faith tradition, and from that perspective it may be less con-
troversial to rely on Nygren’s divisions, it is not the case that Nygren’s views are widely accepted 
to be representative of other Christian traditions (like those of Augustine) from which the author 
draws. Eli Friedland explores the soteriological elements of Nietzsche’s thought, drawing the ex-
plicit connection that hyperanthrpos was translated into German as Ubermensch, a connection that 
positions Nietzsche as a prophet meant to fulfill the law, a 19th century foil for Christ. This claim 
is further supported by his use of the term “antichristian,” where “in Greek,” anti “is to be stand-
ing directly before another, facing him or her” (242).  
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